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Abstract—Intrusion detection in wireless ad hoc networks is a 
challenging task because these networks change their 
topologies dynamically, lack concentration points where 
aggregated traffic can be analyzed, utilize infrastructure 
protocols that are susceptible to manipulation, and rely on 
noisy, intermittent wireless communications. Security remains 
a major challenge for these networks due their features of open 
medium, dynamically changing topologies, reliance on co-
operative algorithms, absence of centralized monitoring points, 
and lack of clear lines of defense. In this paper, we present a 
cooperative, distributed intrusion detection architecture based 
on clustering of the nodes that addresses the security 
vulnerabilities of the network and facilitates accurate detection 
of attacks. The architecture is organized as a dynamic 
hierarchy in which the intrusion data is acquired by the nodes 
and is incrementally aggregated, reduced in volume and 
analyzed as it flows upwards to the cluster-head. The cluster-
heads of adjacent clusters communicate with each other in case 
of cooperative intrusion detection. For intrusion related 
message communication, mobile agents are used for their 
efficiency in lightweight computation and suitability in 
cooperative intrusion detection. Simulation results show 
effectiveness and efficiency of the proposed architecture. 
Keywords-intrusion detection, wireless ad hoc networks, 
cluster, security, denial of service attack.  
I.  INTRODUCTION  
A wireless ad hoc network consists of a collection of 
mobile nodes that communicate with each other through 
wireless links without the aid of any pre-existing 
communication infrastructure. Nodes within each other’s 
radio range communicate directly via wireless links, while 
those that are far apart rely on intermediate nodes to forward 
their messages. Each node can function as a router as well as 
a host. Unlike fixed wired networks, wireless ad hoc 
networks have many operational limitations. For example, 
the wireless links are constrained by transmission range and 
bandwidth, and the mobile nodes may have limited battery 
life, CPU processing power, and memory. The network 
topology may change rapidly due to mobility of the nodes, 
and continuous joining and leaving of the nodes in the 
network. While these characteristics make ad hoc networks 
more flexible, they introduce security concerns that are either 
absent or less severe in wired networks. Ad hoc networks are 
vulnerable to various kinds of attacks that include passive 
eavesdropping, active interfering, impersonation, and denial-
of-service. Although, intrusion prevention measures such as 
strong authentication and redundant transmission can be used 
to improve the security of these networks, these techniques 
can address only a subset of the threats and they are very 
costly to implement. The dynamic nature of ad hoc networks 
requires that prevention techniques should be complemented 
by detection techniques to monitor security status of the 
network and identify any malicious behavior [1]. Intrusion 
detection is a second line of defense that provides local 
security to a node, and also helps in establishing a specific 
trust level of a node in an ad hoc network [2]. Since it is 
impossible to adopt a fully centralized approach to security 
in ad hoc networks [3], a cluster-based semi-centralized 
approach may be adopted that helps in integration of local 
intrusion detection in a node or in a cluster with network-
wide global intrusion detection. 
In this paper, we propose an architecture of a cluster-
based intrusion detection system for wireless ad hoc 
networks. In the proposed scheme, an ad hoc network is 
divided into different clusters using a suitable clustering 
algorithm [4]. The clustering makes the communication 
between the nodes in the network more efficient, as each 
cluster is managed by its cluster-head and inter-cluster 
communication takes place only through the gateway nodes 
[5]. The task of cluster management in a cluster is delegated 
to the cluster-head, which is chosen based on the output an 
election algorithm that is invoked periodically. The rotation 
of cluster management responsibility to different nodes 
ensures a proper load balancing and fault-tolerance in the 
system [6]. We propose to delegate the cluster-wide intrusion 
detection responsibility to the cluster-heads, as apart from 
their default function of cluster management, they can 
initiate a cooperative approach for intrusion detection. Every 
node in the network maintains a database of known attacks 
(misuse signatures). Anomalous activities are defined in 
terms of upper and lower thresholds for identifying any new 
attack against the network [7]. 
The use of mobile agents is proposed for inter-cluster 
communication. The mobile agents are light-weight and 
computationally efficient small software components. They 
enhance the flexibility in cooperative detection ability of a 
distributed intrusion detection system [8]. However, there 
have been some security concerns about the mobile agents 
which need to be investigated further [9][10]. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section II 
presents some related work in the area of intrusion detection 
in wireless ad hoc networks. Section III describes the 
architecture of the proposed system. Section IV presents the 
simulation results carried out on the proposed mechanism. 
Section V concludes the paper and highlights some future 
scope of work.   
II. RELATED WORK 
Different schemes have been proposed for securing ad hoc 
networks using intrusion detections schemes [1][8][11]. In a 
cooperative distributed intrusion detection system proposed 
by Zhang and Lee [1], every node in an ad hoc network 
analyzes locally available network data for anomalies. 
Intrusion attempts are detected by employing a distributed 
cooperative mechanism.  Each node runs intrusion detection 
agents consisting of six modules. The model uses multi-layer 
integration approach to analyze the attack scenario. 
However, the scheme requires large amount of data that 
needs to be passed over wireless links to update the local 
database of anomaly and misuse rules. This is certainly a 
problem in low bandwidth wireless links. Another issue that 
needs to be addressed is how to obtain enough audit data to 
establish the normal patterns of users. Without this data, it is 
almost impossible to carry out anomaly detection accurately. 
Li et al. [2] have used mobile agents for developing a 
coordinated distributed intrusion detection scheme for ad hoc 
networks. In the proposed scheme, the mobile nodes are 
divided into different clusters. The cluster-heads act as the 
manager nodes that contain assistant mobile agents and 
response mobile agents. Each cluster-member node (nodes 
other than the cluster-heads) runs a host monitor agent to 
detect network and host intrusions using intrusion analyzer 
and interpretation base. The assistant agent running on a 
cluster-head is responsible for collecting intrusion-related 
data from the cluster-member nodes. The response agent on 
a cluster-head informs the cluster-member nodes about any 
response initiated by the intrusion detection system against 
possible intrusive activity on the network. However, the 
architecture is not modular as there is no separation of 
functions between the cluster-head nodes and cluster-
member nodes. Moreover, it does not use any clustering 
algorithm to minimize message communication in the 
network for intrusion detection and response.  
Kachriski and Guha [3] have presented an intrusion 
detection system for ad hoc networks, in which multiple 
sensors deployed throughout the network collect and merge 
audit data implementing a cooperative detection algorithm. 
Sensors are deployed on some of the hosts in the network 
that monitor the network traffic. The selection of these nodes 
is based on their connectivity index and the outcome of a 
distributed voting algorithm. The detection decisions are 
taken by mobile agents that transport their execution and 
state information between different sensor hosts of the 
network, and finally return to the originator host with the 
result. The authors have proposed two different methods of 
decision making: independent and collaborative. The 
approach of independent decision making by mobile agents 
is susceptible to single point of failure, and therefore, the 
authors have recommended the use of collaborative 
approach. The main advantage of this proposition is the 
restriction of the computation-intensive operations of the 
system to a few dynamically elected nodes. However, since 
the mobile agent platforms are themselves vulnerable, the 
security proposed scheme may be questionable [10]. 
Albers et al. have proposed a distributed and collaborative 
architecture of intrusion detection system by using mobile 
agents [5]. The authors have proposed the use of a local 
intrusion detection system (LIDS) for monitoring the local 
activities on each node. Two types of data are exchanged 
among the LIDS: security data and intrusion alerts. LIDS 
agents use either the anomaly or misuse detection. Once a 
local intrusion is detected, the LIDS initiates a response and 
informs other nodes in the network. Upon receiving an alert, 
the LIDS protects itself against intrusion by use of a suitable 
defense mechanism. 
Sun et al. have presented an architecture of a zone-based 
intrusion detection system (ZBIDS) that involves a local 
detection and a collaborative detection technique [12]. The 
local detection module consists of a general intrusion 
detection agent model and a Markov chain-based anomaly 
detection algorithm. To enhance the detection efficiency, the 
collaborative detection module is utilized. The collaborative 
detection module works on the ZBIDS agents and uses an 
aggregation algorithm on the gateway nodes in the clustered 
ad hoc network. The authors have proposed the IDS for 
securing routing in the network. The simulation results 
demonstrate that the proposed scheme is not only efficient in 
detecting intrusions but also it has reduced false alarm rates 
appreciably. 
Sterne et al. have proposed a dynamic intrusion detection 
hierarchy that is potentially scalable to large networks [13]. 
The mechanism is based on a clustering approach, in which 
the nodes may be organized in a hierarchy with the cluster-
head nodes at the top level of the hierarchy. Every node in 
the network monitors, logs, analyzes, and sends alerts, and 
responds to the alerts send by other nodes. The cluster heads 
have the additional tasks of (i) data filtering and data fusion, 
(ii) detection of intrusions and (iii) security management.  
Wang et al. have proposed an end-to-end detection of 
wormhole attack (EDWA) that is based on a set of 
mechanisms [14]. In wormhole attack, an adversary builds a 
tunnel between two end points which are multiple hops way 
from each other. The message recorded at one is relayed to 
the other end from where it is broadcasted into the network 
again. In the proposed defense mechanism against wormhole 
attack, the authors have proposed a location-based detection 
mechanism where the source node estimates the minimum 
hop count to the destination based on the geographic 
information of the two end hosts in which the receiver’s 
location is piggy-backed by the route reply packet during the 
route discovery. For, a received route, the source compares 
the hop count value received from the reply packet with its 
estimated value. If the received value is less than the 
estimation, the corresponding route is marked as if a 
wormhole is detected. The, the source launches wormhole 
tracing in which the two end points of the wormhole will be 
identified in a small area provided that there are multi-paths 
existing between the source and destination. Finally, a 
normal route is selected for data communication. 
 
 
III. THE PROPOSED ARCHITECTURE 
Our proposed intrusion detection system has a multi-layer 
cluster-based architecture. At the highest level, the system 
consists of two broad modules: (i) Cluster-Head Module 
(CHM) and (ii) Cluster-Member Module (CMM). These two 
modules are further subdivided to distribute their specific 
functionalities. While the CHM runs only on the cluster-head 
nodes, the CMM runs on all nodes, i.e., the cluster-head 
nodes and the cluster-member nodes in the network. The 
intrusion information, detection and response modules are 
separated with respect to local and global domains. The 
functionalities of the modules are in the following 
subsections. 
A. The Cluster Head Module (CHM) 
The CHM runs on each cluster-head node, and is 
responsible for the management of the cluster-member nodes 
in the cluster. CHM is also responsible for initiating 
cooperative intrusion detection and response action upon 
receiving a request from a cluster-member node. The CHM 
is divided into six modules: (i) cluster management module, 
(ii) network information module, (iii) mobile agent 
management module, (iv) global intrusion information 
module, (v) collaborative intrusion detection module, and 
(vi) global intrusion response module.  The inter-
relationships among the modules are depicted in Figure 1. 
The modules interact with each other via suitable messages 
in order to collect, store, process, and analyze the data. The 
functionalities of these modules are described below.   
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1.  The architecture of the cluster head module (CHM). 
?    represents query messages 
---> represents response messages 
 
The cluster management module manages the cluster by 
performing the functions such as: (i) registration of newly 
joined nodes, (ii) supervision of elections in the cluster, and 
(iii) communication with other nodes in the cluster for 
cooperative intrusion detection. This module consists of 
three sub-modules: (i) cluster-member registration sub-
module, (ii) cluster-head election sub-module, (iii) cluster-
member communication sub-module. In the rest of this 
subsection, the functionalities of these modules are described 
in the rest of this Section. 
The cluster-member registration sub-module is 
responsible for managing all the member nodes in its cluster. 
Every node that comes within the radio range of a cluster-
head and becomes a part of the cluster will have to register 
itself to the cluster-head. The cluster-head election sub-
module is responsible for managing the elections and 
successfully forwarding all cluster-related information to the 
newly elected cluster-head. The cluster-member 
communication sub-module is used for the intra-cluster 
communication between the cluster-head and the cluster-
members. This may be used for cluster-head elections, global 
intrusion detection, coordination among the mobile agents, 
local intrusion update, and global intrusion response actions. 
The network information module keeps track of network-
wide information such as information regarding the cluster-
head nodes of the neighboring clusters. It is the responsibility 
of a cluster-head to inform the neighboring cluster-heads 
about any network-wide intrusion response action, which is 
further propagated to the cluster members of the neighboring 
clusters. 
The mobile agents are created only at the time of 
cooperative intrusion detection. The cluster-head of a cluster 
creates and dispatches the mobile agents and processes the 
results returned by them. If it detects any intrusion, it informs 
the nodes in its own cluster and the adjacent clusters for the 
required response against the intrusion. A database is 
maintained for the mobile agents that are created and 
dispatched. Each of the mobile agents is associated with a 
timer. If a mobile agent returns before the timer expires, the 
data from the result portion is extracted and its entry is 
deleted; if the timer expires before the mobile agent returns, 
the mobile agent is supposed to be lost and a new mobile 
agent is dispatched. The mobile agent management module 
consists of three sub-modules: (i) mobile agent creation sub-
module, (ii) mobile agent dispatch sub-module, (iii) mobile 
agent deletion sub-module. Mobile agent creation sub-
module is responsible for creation of the mobile agents when 
requested by a node for intrusion detection. Mobile agent 
dispatch sub-module is responsible for establishment of a 
route for dispatching every mobile agent. Mobile agent 
deletion sub-module destroys a mobile agent when it 
completes the designated task successfully and returns with 
the results, or when the timer associated with it expires.  
The global intrusion information module maintains 
information about any intrusive activity in a database that is 
known as the intrusion interpreter base [11]. This database is 
automatically updated whenever any network-wide intrusion 
is detected. The global intrusion information module consists 
of two sub-modules: (i) Misuse signature sub-module, and 
(ii) Anomaly behavior sub-module. While the former 
contains information regarding all known attack signatures, 
the latter maintains the definitions of anomalous activities 
with properly defined upper and lower threshold values. The 
detection process may use either misuse signature or 
anomalous activities or both. For power-constrained nodes, 
only misuse detection may be done.       
The collaborative intrusion detection module contains 
the procedures and algorithms that are invoked for 
cooperative detection of intrusions. This module consists of 
three sub-modules: (i) mobile agent result processing sub-
module, (ii) misuse detection sub-module, and (iii) anomaly 
detection sub-module. When a mobile agent returns after 
being processed at all the nodes mentioned in its itinerary, 
the results that are placed by each node as a result of 
processing are examined by the cluster-head. The mobile 
agent result processing sub-module is responsible for 
processing the results obtained from each node that are 
collected by the mobile agents. The misuse detection sub-
module is responsible for detection of intrusions that match 
with attack signatures existing in the current database. The 
anomaly detection sub-module is responsible for detection of 
anomalous activities on the basis of suitably defined upper 
and lower thresholds. 
The global intrusion response module initiates an action 
when a cluster member either reports an intrusion, or it 
detects an intrusion after processing the information 
collected by the mobile agents. This response action may be 
local to the cluster or global to the entire network. This 
module consists of three sub-modules: (i) trust computation 
sub-module, (ii) cluster-based response sub-module, and (iii) 
network-wide response sub-module. The trust computation 
sub-module computes the trust for each node. The trust value 
of a node decreases if it performs any anomalous activity. On 
the other hand, the trust level gradually increases with time if 
a node does not perform any anomalous activity. The trust 
level of a node may only increase till it reaches a maximum 
value. The cluster-based response module initiates an 
intrusion response after the results from the mobile agents 
are processed. A cluster-head can also generate a network-
wide response. In case of a network-wide response, the 
network-wide response sub-module on a cluster-head node 
generates a response to the neighboring cluster-heads which, 
in turn, forward the response in their respective clusters. In 
this way, the information about a misbehaving node is 
propagated throughout the network.   
B. Cluster Member Module (CMM) 
The CMM runs on all nodes- cluster-head nodes and the 
cluster-member nodes in the network. It maintains the data 
collected locally by the cluster-members about intrusion 
detection and response. If need arises, it may request the 
cluster-head node for initiating a cooperative intrusion 
detection and response action. This happens when the local 
data available to the CMM are not sufficient to make a 
concrete conclusion about an intrusive activity and more 
information from cluster-member nodes in the same cluster 
or other clusters are required. The CMM is further divided 
into six sub-modules: (i) cluster-head communication 
module, (ii) local information module, (iii) mobile agent 
communication module, (iv) local intrusion information 
module, (v) multi-layer intrusion detection module, and (vi) 
local intrusion response module. The inter-relationships 
among these modules are depicted in Figure 2. The detailed 
functionalities of these modules are discussed in the 
following. 
 
 
 
Fig. 2.  The architecture of the cluster member module (CMM). 
?    represents query messages 
--> represents response messages 
 
The cluster-head communication module in each node 
communicates with the cluster-head for sending information 
regarding a possible local intrusion and also for sending a 
request to the cluster-head to dispatch mobile agents for 
initiating a cooperative intrusion detection and response 
action. This module is divided into two sub-modules: (i) 
local intrusion update sub-module, (ii) co-operative intrusion 
detection request sub-module. The local intrusion update 
sub-module informs the cluster-head when it detects any 
local intrusion in that node. The cluster-head logs the entry 
and may use this information in future for intrusion 
detection. The co-operative detection request sub-module 
allows a node to send a request to the cluster-head to initiate 
cooperative intrusion detection when it cannot conclusively 
detect an intrusion locally but observes some suspicious 
activities. On receiving such a request, the cluster-head 
dispatches a mobile agent to gather information from other 
members in the cluster, and then processes the gathered 
information to detect any intrusion in a global scale. 
The local information module invokes the election 
algorithm and voting for dynamically electing the cluster-
head from the cluster-member nodes. The election algorithm 
is invoked periodically. When a cluster-head initiates an 
election, every cluster-member casts its vote for the new 
cluster-head based on the trust levels associated with the 
nodes. The node that gets the maximum number of votes is 
elected as the cluster-head. In case of ties among two or 
more nodes, other parameters e.g., connectivity index [8] 
may be used to break the tie. The frequency of invocation of 
the election algorithm depends on the mobility of the nodes 
in the network. For networks with high mobility, the 
topology changes fast and election needs to take place 
frequently. This will ensure that a node elected as the cluster-
head will always have a high trust value and a good 
connectivity index leading to a reduction in message 
communication overhead among the cluster-member nodes. 
The mobile agent communication module takes care of 
the execution of the mobile agents that are dispatched by the 
cluster-heads. It also collects the results returned by the 
mobile agents. The module consists of two sub-modules: (i) 
mobile agent code execution sub-module, and (ii) mobile 
agent result collection sub-module. Mobile agent code 
execution sub-module is responsible for execution of the 
code contained the mobile agent. The code is executed at 
each of the nodes in the itinerary of the agent. For a mobile 
agent to execute, suitable platform must be present in each 
node. After completion of execution on a node, a mobile 
agent collects the results and moves to the next node on its 
itinerary. The mobile agent result collection sub-module is 
responsible for collection of the results of execution. The 
results returned by a mobile agent are collected and analyzed 
at the cluster-head from which it originated. 
The local intrusion information module maintains a 
database known as ‘intrusion interpreter base’, which 
includes the process of learning [11]. This database is 
updated whenever a new intrusion is detected in the network. 
This module consists of five sub-modules corresponding to 
the five layers of the TCP/IP stack- application layer, 
transport layer, network layer, data-link layer, and physical 
layer. The application layer intrusion sub-module defines the 
legitimate uses at the application layer such as, the 
authorized users, their passwords, number of permitted failed 
login attempts, the applications that can be accessed etc. The 
transport layer sub-module looks for legitimacy of the 
established sessions, protocol usage, connection time etc. At 
the network layer, the important activities are routing table 
management, route update notification and verification, etc. 
The channels for communication, the protocol used for 
communication e.g., CSMA/CD etc are important concerns 
at the data-link layer sub-module. The physical layer sub-
module is concerned with issues related to direct physical 
access of the system. An attacker can passively eavesdrop on 
the network traffic as well as the traffic generated by the 
intrusion detection system, can insert noise in the wireless 
channel for DoS attack and can also jam the network by 
injection of spurious messages. The physical layer sub-
module must detect these attacks [7].  
The multi-layer intrusion detection module makes 
intrusion detection possible at each layer of the TCP/IP 
stack. It is necessary to detect and respond against intrusions 
at appropriate layers. As wireless networks cannot have any 
centralized firewall, intrusion detection in the application 
layer is necessary for attacks such as ‘back-door’ or DoS 
attack [1]. Accordingly, this module consists of five sub-
modules corresponding to the five layers of the TCP/IP 
stack. 
The local intrusion response module at the each node 
computes the trust values of the nodes in its cluster and 
invokes an appropriate intrusion response action, if required. 
The nodes having high trust values can only participate in 
election to become a cluster-head node. A cluster member 
node can take two types of intrusion response actions. On 
detecting a local intrusion, a node may initiate a response 
such as blocking the access privilege of the user on the 
network resources. In this case, it does not communicate this 
action to the other nodes in the cluster. However, a member 
node may also communicate its response action to its cluster-
head. In that case, the cluster head logs the event and informs 
other nodes in the same cluster or all the nodes in the 
network about the event and isolate the offending node from 
the network.  
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS 
The proposed scheme has been implemented on network 
simulator ns-2 [15] to evaluate its performance. The 802.11 
MAC layer in ns2 is used for this purpose. The chosen 
parameters for simulation are shown in Table I.  
Before we discuss the performance results of the system, 
we describe the simulation for clustering.  For cluster 
formation in the network, we have simulated passive 
clustering.  
TABLE I.  SIMULATION PARAMATERS 
Parameters Values 
Simulation area                     
Number of mobile nodes 
Transmission range 
Movement model 
Traffic type 
Channel capacity 
Total number of flows 
Avg. packet flow rate 
Packet size 
Send buffer at each node 
Training execution time 
Testing execution time 
Host pause time 
500 * 500 m 
30 
250 m 
Random waypoint 
CBR (UDP) 
2 Mbps 
15 
2 packets/s 
512 bytes/packet 
64 packet (fixed) 
1000 s 
50 s 
5 s 
 
Passive clustering is an on-demand protocol. It constructs 
and maintains the cluster architecture only when there are 
on-going data packets that piggyback cluster-related 
information (e.g. the state of a node in a cluster, the IP 
address of the node etc.). Each node collects neighbor 
information through promiscuous packet receptions. Passive 
clustering has also two essential components: (i) first 
declaration wins rule and (ii) gateway selection heuristic. 
With the first declaration wins rule, a node that first 
claims to be a cluster-head, rules the rest of the nodes in its 
cluster area. Each cluster is assumed to be 2-hop long, i.e., 
each cluster-member may be at a maximum 2-hop distance 
from its cluster-head. In passive clustering, to make sure that 
all the neighbors have been checked, there is no waiting 
period. This is in contrast to all the weight-driven clustering 
mechanisms [4]. The cluster-heads are assumed to broadcast 
their beacons over 2 hops in every 20 seconds time interval. 
The gateway selection heuristic provides a procedure to 
elect the minimum number of gateways (including 
distributed gateways) required to maintain the connectivity 
in a distributed manner. A gateway is a bridge node that 
connects two adjacent clusters. The beacon message, sent 
periodically by a cluster-head in a cluster, contains 
information that includes the identifications of the cluster-
members, and the gateway node in the cluster. The gateway 
nodes also send beacons to inform the cluster-members 
about the adjacent clusters. In the proposed scheme, the 
gateway selection mechanism is designed in such a way that 
it eventually allows only one gateway for each pair of 
neighboring cluster-heads. However, in certain situations it 
may be possible that there is no gateway node between two 
clusters. This scenario, although very unlikely in reasonably 
dense ad hoc networks, may occur if two adjacent cluster 
heads are mutually reachable not by a two-hop route. Then 
the clustering scheme should select the two intermediate 
nodes as distributed gateways. Passive clustering maintains 
clusters using implicit time-out. A node assumes that the 
nodes it had previously heard from have died or are out of its 
locality if they have not sent any data within the time-out 
duration. With a reasonable network communication load, a 
node can easily keep track of dynamic topology changes by 
virtue of this time-out. 
For the purpose of evaluation of the detection efficiency 
of the system, we have simulated four types of attacks on the 
network layer. We have assumed that the goal of the attacker 
is to degrade the performance of the network or individual 
nodes instead of gaining privileges of a particular node in the 
network. This assumption means that the proposed IDS 
focuses on detecting traffic-related attacks. Some of the well-
known attacks in this category are: power exhaustion, 
storage and CPU exhaustion attacks, network bandwidth 
exhaustion attacks such as flooding and deprivation attacks, 
routing-disruption attacks such as blackhole and grayhole 
attacks etc. [16].  
Table II shows the experimental results obtained from the 
simulation. It is observed that the proposed system have 
effectively detected the simulated attacks launched against it 
at the network layer with a very low false positive rates. 
More sophisticated attack simulations at transport and 
application layer will be made and results will be reported 
when available. 
TABLE II.  PERFORMANCE RESULTS 
Attack Type Detection Rate False Alarm Rate 
Flooding 100% 2.8% 
Blackhole 99.3% 0.3% 
Sleep Deprivation 90% 0.7% 
Packet Dropping (All) 93% 0.5% 
V. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we have presented a cluster-based intrusion 
detection architecture for wireless ad hoc networks. The 
clustering of the network nodes makes message 
communication efficient and intrusion detection system 
robust. Local detection allows for detection of attacks, which 
are localized to a node or a cluster, whereas global detection 
involves collaboration among the nodes in different clusters. 
A mobile agent framework is deployed for communication 
among the nodes for intrusion related information. The 
results obtained in simulations show that the scheme is 
effective and efficient. As a future scope of work, we plan to 
identify different attack techniques and their consequences at 
different layers of the TCP/IP stack. We also plan to 
investigate and determine the optimum number of clusters 
that maximizes the system performance. 
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